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Is Poverty a Binding Constraint on Growth
in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Jean-Yves Duclos and Stephen A. O'Connell

1 Introduction
The literature on pro-poor growth studies the links from national growth
strategies and patterns to poverty outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is
to look at the other direction of the nexus: the links from poverty to growth.
By poverty we mean a state in which household consumption is below some
absolute purchasing power standard. Figure 3.1 uses survey data from the World
Bank's PovcalNet online database to compare the prevalence of consumption
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2011 with that of other developing regions. ^
Africa is by far the poorest region in the world. If there are links from poverty to
growth in the development process, then certainly Africa is the main place to worry
about them and accommodate them in the formation of growth strategies.
Our central argument is that the most promising directions for countrybased research on the links from poverty to growth involve microeconomic
investigations of the effects of poverty on productivity. The bulk of the
chapter is devoted to reviewing the dominant mechanisms through which
these effects may emerge, both from a macro and from a micro perspective.

2 Development Traps: Framing the Issues
At the economy-wide level, a link from poverty to growth is a link from the
level of income per capita, y, to the growth rate of income per capita, g. In
' <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0>, last accessed 11 May 2015.
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Figure 3.1. Poverty headcount ratios: percentage of population below $1.25 of con
sumption per day in 2011 (at 2005 PPP), by region
Notes: Headcounts are defined as the percentage of the population with consumption below $1.25
pet day (at 2005 PPP).
The boxes enclose the central half of the distribution of headcounts for each region; the
horizontal line within the box is at the regional median. The 'whiskers' extend to the maximum
and minimum values for the region, excluding outliers which ate shown as dots.
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; SASl = South Asia; EAP = East Asia
and Pacific; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; ECA: Europe and Central Asia. Industrial
economies ate excluded.
PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: World Bank, PovcalNet online database.

functional notation, g = f (y, z), where z is a vector of underlying growth
determinants or fundamentals. The Solow (1956) growth model provides a
familiar example and we use it here as a point of departure.

2.1 A growth-theory perspective
Figure 3.2 shows a neoclassical production function y = A k°' where k is the
capital stock per worker, >1 > 0 is the level of total factor productivity (TFP),
which we treat here as a constant, and a e (0,1) is the share of capital in
national income. For given rates of saving, depreciation, and population growth
(s, S, and n), the capital stock per worker is stationary when saving is just
sufficient to keep the capital stock per worker from falling—or, equivalently,
when output per worker is a multiple (n + 8)/s of the capital stock per worker.
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Figure 3.2. The Solow model
Note: The dotted line is the per-worker production function y = A-k^, for 71 = 3 and a = 0.4. The
straight line is [(n+8)/s]-k, for n = 0.03, S = 0.04 and s = 0.20. The steady state occurs where these two
loci cross or, equivalently, where total saving s-y equals the amount of investment required to keep

the capital stock pet worker from falling, (n+8)-k. To the left (right) of this intersection, the capital
stock per worker is rising (falling).
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Steady states therefore occur at all intersections of A • with [(n + S)/s] • k. Given
diminishing returns to capital, there is only one such intersection with
a positive capital stock. At this steady state, the value of income per worker,
y* = [A-s/(n + 8)]“^^““, is a continuous function of the vector of fundamentals
z = [A, s, «, 8, a].
The phase diagram for the Solow model shows a monotonically decreasing
relationship between growth and income, holding z constant (Figure 3.3).
This configuration implies that, for a given set of fundamentals, the poorer a
country is, the faster it grows. This property, known as conditional convergence,
is widely viewed as the central implication of the neoclassical growth model
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). A stronger yetsion—absolute convergence—
applies if cross-country differences in the fundamentals are small; in this case
all countries approach the same steady state, and along the transition path
the proportional difference between any two incomes shrinks over time.
These convergence properties continue to hold if TFP grows at an exogenous
rate common across all countries; in this case economies approach a steadystate growth path rather than a constant income level.
The Solow model therefore offers a simple account of the link between
income and growth: holding the fundamentals constant, poor countries
grow faster than rich ones, because low income indicates a scarcity of capital
and therefore a high return on investment. The force of this link is greater if
international capital mobility is stronger, but it holds even in a financially
closed global economy.
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Figure 3.3. Phase diagram for the Solow model
Source: Authors' calculations, based on the Solow model in Figure 3.2.

As Pritchett (2004) puts it, absolute convergence fails 'big time', both over
centuries and in data from the post-WWII period. Quah (1993; 1996; 2001)
and others study the empirical distribution of cross-country incomes per
capita after 1960 and argue that the way in which absolute convergence fails
is not random. By contrast with a situation in which some countries are
endowed with low-income fundamentals, others with medium-income, and
others with high-income, the empirical distribution shows a tendency to
develop twin peaks over time. Two convergence clubs can be distinguished,
one of which has gone through a largely irreversible historical process of
industrialization and development and the other of which—comprising the
UN's least-developed countries. Collier's (2007) bottom billion, or larger
groups below some development threshold—has not. The lagging growth
performance of sub-Saharan Africa has played a major role in global diver
gence since 1960, and most of the continent continues to fall within the lowdevelopment group (Berthelemy, 2007; Ndulu and O'Connell, 2007; Sachs
et al., 2004).
Not surprisingly, the Solow model does considerably better empirically once
the fundamentals are allowed to differ across countries. The standard
approach in the growth literature is to estimate a linearized version of ^ =
fly; z) using cross-country panel data. When this is done, the parameter that
captures dfjdy is robustly negative and statistically significant (Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil, 1992; Hoeffler, 2002). Barro (1991), Sachs and Warner
(1997), and others go further, retaining the conditional convergence term
but implicitly modeling the Solow fundamentals as functions of deeper
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determinants. In this approach, z = z(w), where w may include policy vari
ables, geographical determinants of productivity, or institutional aspects of
the investment environment; the growth equation becomes g = fiy;w).
Within the growth literature, the leading theoretical alternative to the
neoclassical approach is the endogenous growth tradition initiated by
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). This approach models the productivity term
in
as a stock that can be accumulated through purposive investment
activity—in human capital for example, or research and development. Since
knowledge is a public good, this process is subject to positive externalities
that scale up the productivity impact of any individual's investment. In
the simplest 'AK' versions of endogenous growth theory, the aggregate pro
duction function becomes y = A-k, where k is a broad concept of reproducible
capital and A is a constant (the average product of broad capital) that
can differ across countries. These economies display constant returns to
broad capital and therefore have no steady-state level of income. The condi
tional convergence term is absent in the growth equation, which now
becomes g = f[z) ox g = f{w).

2.2 Development traps
The twin peaks phenomenon identifies a set of countries that remained poor
after 1960. But did these countries fail to grow because they were poor? Equiva
lently: is low income self-perpetuating at the national level? So far our answer
is no. Within the neoclassical and AK traditions, persistently low income is
driven by weak fundamentals and not by low income per se. Low income may
be persistent but it is not self-perpetuating, unless the fundamentals them
selves are functions of income.
If z = z(y; w) or w = w(y), then of course things are more complicated.
Holding constant any fundamentals that do not depend on income (call
these x), we now have g = fty; x), where the impact of income includes any
indirect effect operating through the fundamentals. The net impact of income
on growth, df/dy, can now easily be non-monotonic. Figure 3.4 shows an
example studied by Solow (1956) himself, in which TFP follows a logistic
curve, rising smoothly from A = ltoA = 3asa country traverses a middle
range of capital stocks per worker. Here A =A{k) or, implicitly, A = A(y).^ The
phase diagram is now non-monotonic (see Figure 3.5), implying that poor
countries may grow more slowly than otherwise identical rich countries.

^ Here y=A-k'‘, sok = k{A,y). Substituting A = A(fc) yieids the implicit function A(y). In Figures 3.4
and 3.5, we use a = 0.4 and>l = 1 + [2/(1 + exp(a-/;)], A = l + [2/(1 -H exp (a - it))] with « = IS for the
multiple equilibrium case and a = 8 for the persistence case.
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Figure 3.4. Variable productivity models
Notes: The upper and lower concave production functions take the form y = A-hP *, with A = 1 and

.4 = 3. The production functions drawn with heavy solid or dashed lines use A = 1 + [2/(1 + exp(a-it)],
with a = 15 for the multiple equilibrium (solid) case and a = 8 for the persistence (dashed) case.

If df/dy is sufficiently non-monotonic, the growth equation
fly; x) crosses
the horizontal axis more than once. Crossings with df/dy > 0 define thresholds
below which income falls and above which it rises, while crossings with
df/dy < 0 are locally stable steady states.
The development economics literature is full of theoretical models in
which the aggregate economy has two locally stable steady states. Recent
overviews include Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) and Azariadis and Stachurski
(2005); Sachs et al. (2004) develop three examples in the context of subSaharan Africa. While the lower of these two equilibria is commonly called a
poverty trap, the reference to poverty is potentially misleading. Income is lower
in the bad equilibrium than in the good equilibrium, but the relationship of
the low-income equilibrium to any absolute income standard is unclear.
Moreover, if productivity grows at a common global rate it is the cross-country
ratios of income, not the levels, that approach a steady state. We therefore
follow Berthelemy (2007) in referring to these low-income equilibria as devel
opment traps.
There are good reasons, moreover, to discount the tendency of theoretical
treatments to focus on multiplicity per se. In terms of policy significance,
there is little distinction between a world in which low income is one of a
number of long-term equilibria and one in which low income is associated
with very slow growth. In either case a large enough temporary boost to the
capital stock can produce a long-lasting improvement in the growth path, in
sharp contrast with the decline in growth that would occur in a conditional
convergence world with fixed fundamentals. Observationally too, the two

59

Jean-Yves Duclos and Stephen A. O'Connell
cases may be equivalent or nearly so: in both cases low income can persist over
a long period and twin peaks can emerge in the cross-sectional distribution of
national incomes (Kremer, Onatski, and Stock, 2001). In our view, therefore,
multiplicity is too strong a criterion for thinking about links from income to
growth. In what follows, we define a development trap as any situation in which
low average income holds back aggregate economic growth for an extended
period (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Quah, 2001).

2.3 Productivity and accumuiation
The traps in Figure 3.5, whether they constitute distinct low-income equilibria
or not, are driven by a phase of sharply increasing returns to aggregate invest
ment. Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) associate this phase with diffuse exter
nalities to household- and firm-level investments in human capital or
industrial technology. Other mechanisms may of course be relevant as well,
since at this high level of aggregation A comprises any influence on the
relationship between output per worker and the concave function
of

convergence

- - - persistence

--------- multiplicity

Figure 3.5. Phase diagrams for variable productivity models
Notes: The phase diagrams correspond to the uppermost concave production function in Figure 3.4

(A = 3) and to the two production functions with convex portions.
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physical capital per worker.^ We discuss a variety of potential mechanisms
throughout this chapter.
Early trap models, however, often focused on capital accumulation rather
than on productivity (references appear in Sachs et al., 2004). A subsistence
floor for consumption, for example, can generate a positive correlation
between saving rates and income, so that the [{n + S)/s]-k locus becomes
strictly convex over some range. Theories of the demographic transition can
have a similar effect, by generating a negative correlation between fertility
rates and income (perhaps indirectly, through the impact of education and
labour-market opportunities on female labour force participation). If these
effects are strong enough, the phase diagram can become non-monotonic
even if the production function itself displays diminishing returns. Low
income can then persist over long periods and, as in the A(k) case, this
possibility is present even if the long-term equilibrium is unique and identical
across countries.
While saving and fertility-based traps may have some relevance for subSaharan Africa, the global growth evidence is more decisive on the importance
of persistent differences in productivity. Figure 3.6 illustrates this point using a
celebrated argument from Lucas (1990). Using data from 1990, Lucas pointed
out that if the USA and India occupied the same diminishing-returns produc
tion function, the roughly 11:1 ratio of observed real GDPs per capita would
require a ratio of physical capital per worker of about 400:1 (= 11
where a is
the share of capital in GDP, assumed to be 0.4). The actual ratio was an order of
magnitude lower, at less than 20:1. Moreover, if the ratio of capital stocks per
worker were really 400:1, the marginal return to capital would be 400^““ ^ 36
times larger in India than in the USA. No conceivable tax differential or
difference in country risk could then prevent capital from flowing from New
York to Delhi. But the reverse was tme: capital flowed from Delhi to New York.
There was no way, Lucas argued, that the USA and India could occupy the
same neoclassical production function. If the USA was at a point like 2 in
Figure 3.6, India had to be at a point like 4, on a different and strictly inferior
production function.
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) responded to Lucas by introducing
human capital as a third factor of production. They specify a neoclassical
production function of the form Y — A FC“H^L^““~^ where H is the stock of
human capital and a -i- /3 < 1 implies diminishing returns to broad capital.
When squeezed into the form y = AFC“, this function can generate

^ One of the most obvious—^which we will not pursue here—is that physical or human capital
may be systematically overestimated in poor countries. Prichett (2000) and Hsleh and Klenow
(2007) argue that this is the case for physical capital, and Manuelll and Seshadri (2007) argue that it
is the case for human capital.
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Figure 3.6. The growth facts imply large productivity differences: USA-India example
Notes: The tangents at points 2, 3, and 4 show the marginal product of capital.

cross-country differences in measured total factor productivity, A, even if
actual TFP, A, is the same across countries: A = A-h^, where h is human capital
per worker. Low levels of human capital can then help explain the coexistence
of low incomes with low marginal returns to investment.
Incorporating human capital goes some way towards resolving Lucas's
puzzle, but country income differences remain too large to be accounted for
by differences even in broad (physical plus human) capital per worker, in the
absence of some phase of strongly increasing returns."* Hall and Jones (1999)
document this point in detail, showing that TFP differences account for
the bulk of international differences in income even after controlling for
measured human capital. A similar point emerges in conventional growth
accounting exercises. Comparing growth in Africa with growth in other
developing regions, Ndulu and O'Connell (2007) find that differences in
conventionally measured physical and human capital per worker account
for only about half of Africa's shortfall between 1960 and 2000.
Income-dependent saving and fertility behaviours are therefore unlikely, on
their own, to explain Africa's failure to industrialize. The reason is that these
mechanisms work through capital scarcity, and in a world of diminishing
returns this means high returns to investment, not low returns. Irrevocably
hostile fundamentals can, of course, explain a confluence of low income and
low returns to investment (as in a conventional conditional convergence
world), but in such cases poverty is an effect rather than a cause of slow

* Lucas estimated a 5:1 ratio of human capital per worker and showed that an 11:1 ratio of
incomes then implied a ratio of capital stocks pet worker of Just over 70:1 (USA:India) and a ratio of
marginal products of capital of about 13:1 (India:USA). These are still fat too large; see Banerjee and
Duflo (2005) for further discussion.
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growth. If development traps are empirically important, therefore, other
mechanisms must be at work to keep the productivity of capital low when
income itself is low.

2.4 Poverty in the binding constraints approach
We point out in what follows that the theory of development traps is well
ahead of empirical evidence. For that reason it is also well ahead of policy, at
least in the area of growth strategy where traps suggest potentially large pay
offs to policy intervention but the literature provides little guidance on where
and how to intervene.^ To develop this point we briefly consider the role of
poverty in the binding constraints framework of Hausmann, Velasco, and
kodrik (2005).
Hausmann, Velasco, and Rodrik (2005) motivate a flexible and countryfocused approach to growth-oriented policy reform by appealing to a variant
of our one-sector growth equation g = f{z). In their framework the steady-state
growth of output per worker is given by ^ = ct[(1 - t) r - p], where a is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption in successive
periods; r = r(a, 6, &) is the social rate of return on capital; t is the tax rate on
capital (so that (1 - r)-r is the private return on capital); and p is the interest
rate at which the country's residents can borrow in world markets. The social
rate of return depends on firm-level TFP, given in their notation by a, on an
index d of the externalities to private investment, and on an indicator & of the
availability of complementary factors of production, including public infra
structure capital or human capital. The tax rate t is to be interpreted broadly; it
can refer to either actual or expected taxes and to formal or informal levies on
private returns.
Hausmann et al. (2005) develop a diagnostic algorithm of sorts by translat
ing their growth equation into a hierarchical analysis of potential growth
constraints (see Table 3.1). Rodrik (2007) describes the growth diagnostics
approach as follows:
These two equations [for g and r] summarize the possible factors that can affect
growth performance. An exercise of growth diagnostics simply consists of reviewing
and analyzing these factors to ascertain which of these factors is the most binding
constraint on growth. As the analysis above reveals, all factors (including market
distortions and policy wedges) are likely to matter for growth and welfare. The
challenge is to identify the one that provides the largest positive direct effect, so

* 'The new literature on poverty traps has yet to focus on issues of policy design.' (Bowles,
Dutlauf, and Hoff, 2006, p. 11).
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Table 3.1. Growth diagnostics a la Hausmann et al. (2005)
Low return to
economic activity

High cost of finance

Low social returns

Poor geography
Low human capital
Bad infrastructure
Low appropriability
Government
Micro risks: property rights,
failures
corruption, taxes
Macro risks: financial,
monetary, fiscal instability
Market failures
Information externalities:
'self-discovery'
Coordination externalities
Bad international finance
Bad local finance
Low domestic saving
Poor intermediation

Source: Rodrik (2007), Figure 2.1, p. 66. The table classifies potential constraints on private investment and entrepre
neurship. 'Social' returns here refer to economy-wide returns; i.e., impacts on GDP. The references to 'low returns' and
'low appropriability' refer to low private returns and low ability of private agents to appropriate the social returns to their
own activity.

that even after taking into account second-best interactions and indirect effects,
the net impact of a policy change is beneficial (and hopefully sizeable).
[Rodrik 2007, p. 64, italics in original®]

Notice that in contrast to the neoclassical model the level of income does
not appear directly in the Hausmann et al. (2005) growth equation. The
reason for this is that the underlying production function has an endogenous
growth structure with constant returns to capital (an 'AK' modeF). Low
income can nonetheless affect growth indirectly, as we have been emphasiz
ing, via the vector of fundamentals z = [a, a, 8, v, r, p]; or, equivalently, via the
ten channels identified in Table 3.1. Thus while poverty plays no explicit role
in the Hausmann et al. analysis, it can in principle act as a binding constraint
on growth, by activating other constraints. Examples might include credit
market failures that mle out collateral-free borrowing (poor intermediation); a
low opportunity cost of violence leading to a high risk of armed conflict
(insecure property rights); a low fiscal capability to address constraints of
geography and infrastructure (low social returns); and predatory taxation of
capital in order to redistribute resources to a poor majority (micro risks). We
discuss some of these further in section 3.
The growth diagnostics framework makes an important distinction between
growth constraints associated with high social returns to investment and
constraints associated with low social returns ('social' here simply means

® See Rodrik's web page for links to country studies that use the growth diagnostics approach to
identify binding constraints.
^ The per-worker production function is y = r-k, so r corresponds to A in the production function
Y = A-K.
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'economy-wide'; the concept refers to impacts on discounted aggregate out
put). The former category implies some combination of market and/or gov
ernment failures, and therefore has the enticing feature of potentially
invalidating the classical trade-off between equity and efficiency. Hoff and
Stiglitz (2001) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005) argue that the absence of this
trade-off is an empirically important feature of the economic environment in
low-income countries. The argument these authors are making is two-fold:
first, that resources are allocated inefficiently because of incomplete markets
and/or misguided policies, and second, that these inefficiencies are biased
against the poor (an argument prominently associated with the World Devel
opment Report (World Bank, 2005)). We return to these themes shortly, in our
discussion of microeconomic poverty traps. But two key points must follow
immediately. First, when the equity/efficiency trade-off is absent, povertyalleviation policies may acquire what Ray (1998) calls a functional justification:
they improve overall economic performance. Growth strategies that miss this
point may fail to produce growth. Second, however, the precise form of such
policies is unclear. The binding constraints approach relies heavily on the
principle of policy targeting, which states that effective interventions tend to
be those that most closely target the sources rather than the symptoms of
distortions (Rodrik, 2007, p. 90). Even in the presence of a microeconomic
poverty trap, direct redistribution to the poor may or may not qualify, depend
ing on the ancillary costs of such a policy and the returns to alternative
reforms. China's agricultural reforms of the 1980s, for example, are generally
regarded as having been massively progressive and growth promoting. But
these focused more on changing production incentives at the margin than on
redistributing existing resources (a distinction emphasized by Chenery et al.,
1974; see Qian, 2003 on China's reforms).
Some of the constraints that Hausmann et al. place in the second category,
of reducing the social returns to investment in physical capital and entrepre
neurship, are associated with low levels of human and/or public infrastructure
capital. These forms of capital may themselves carry high social returns, in
which case their scarcity again points to market and/or government failures
that may invalidate the equity/efficiency trade-off. Credit market imperfec
tions that prevent the poor from making high-yielding investments in human
capital provide one example; the under-provision of productivity-enhancing
public goods in poor areas provides another. But other constraints that keep
social returns low can raise more difficult—and conventional—trade-offs.
Geographical constraints, for example, may reduce the returns to a wide
range of public and private investments, as argued by Faye et al. (2004) and
Collier and O'Connell (2007) for landlocked and resource-poor countries in
Africa. In such cases growth may in effect be prohibitively expensive, in the
sense that for known technologies an investment programme capable of
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overcoming natural constraints reduces appropriately discounted consumption.
In such cases the appropriate locus for redistribution would be primarily inter
national rather than national. As is traditional in public economics, such
intervention would appeal to intrinsic rather than functional justifications,
drawing on inequality aversion, universal rights, or other ethical frameworks.
It might also be motivated by cross-border externalities from low income, for
example operating through conflict.

2.5 Empirical work on economy-wide development traps
Given our discussion, it should not be surprising that the growth literature
remains indecisive about the empirical relevance of development traps. Cross
country growth regressions do not tend to be directly informative. At issue is
the shape of the phase diagram relating the level of income to its growth rate,
perhaps conditional on some exogenous fundamentals—the relationship we
have called f{y; x) above. The growth literature, instead, estimates structural
models of the form g=f{y;z) where some or all of the z may be functions of y as
well as of X.
Research on development traps per se has focused almost exclusively on
whether conditions are such as to favour multiple equilibria. Support comes
from Quah (1993; 1996), who studied the evolution over time of the empirical
distribution of national incomes and documented the emergence of a bimodal
(twin peaks) pattern comprising distinct and largely stable groups of high- and
low-income countries. Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003) also find that the
data favour two groups over one; and they show that the level of steady-state
income and the probability of exiting the low-income group depend on
rainfall and other aspects of tropical geography. The latter variables play the
role of deep fundamentals or ‘x’ variables in our terminology, suggesting the
presence of a geographically based development trap. The mechanisms
through which this trap operates, however, remain unclear.
Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) find some evidence in cross-country data
of threshold effects associated with financial development. Berthelemy (2007)
studies country-by-country growth trajectories over time, looking for the
'inverted U' configurations suggested by Figure 3.5. He argues that while
institutional factors, investment rates, and demographic features were broadly
similar between low-income countries that experienced take-offs after 1950
and those that did not, the former group had achieved significantly higher
rates of primary education before growth accelerated.
Elsewhere in the growth literature the empirical support for development
traps has tended to be weaker. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) find that saving rates
vary with aggregate income, but not in a manner capable of generating
development traps. Easterly (2006) and Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian
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(2007) conclude that the saving rates of poor countries are not low enough to
generate an accumulation-based trap. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) look for evi
dence of inaeasing returns to capital that are strong enough in the aggregate to
generate a trap; they fail to find such evidence, either in the developingcountry literature or in their own cross-country estimates for Africa.

3 Microeconomic Poverty Traps
We have defined a development trap as a situation in which income increases
can become self-perpetuating: dg/dy > 0 over some interval of y. A poverty trap,
from this perspective, is a development trap that is activated when income is
near or below some standard of absolute deprivation. This approach to pov
erty traps accommodates cross-country heterogeneity in incomes, but it
ignores the important role played by within-country inequality and poverty,
both in the growth literature and in the formulation of country-level growth
strategies. A transparent way to bring these considerations on board is to
define an economy-wide poverty trap as a situation in which aggregate growth
is constrained by the low incomes of the poor.
It is not obvious, of course, that accommodating intra-national inequality
strengthens the theoretical case for economy-wide poverty traps. The classical
economists, for example, viewed inequality as good for growth. Workers were
consumers rather than savers, and comprised the bulk of the population;
international financial markets were closed. Investment had to come from
saving by the wealth-owning classes, and this meant that growth required a
high income share for capitalists (see Galor and Moav, 2004).® But more recent
theories deemphasize accumulation, as we have stressed, and feature a variety
of mechanisms through which inequality can undermine productivity and
^owth. The growth evidence, as well, points increasingly to negative impacts
of inequality on growth (Btoabou, 1996).
For a given level of mean income or consumption, it turns out to be difficult
to distinguish the growth impacts of within-country poverty from those of
within-country inequality. The reason is that household survey data tend to
produce distributions that are nearly lognormal, a distribution fully charac
terized by the mean and standard deviation of log consumption. Poverty
headcounts are therefore almost exact functions of these two parameters,
implying that growth regressions that include a conditional convergence
term and a measure of overall inequality will have difficulty distinguishing
® Lewis (1954) brought this tradition into development economics. like Ricardo, Lewis had
to stmggle with the role of landowners, a wealth-owning class prone in the classical view to
consumption rather than saving.
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the impact of the poverty headcount. This constraint may recede as better data
make it possible to exploit modest deviations from log-normality. Ravallion
(2012), for example, finds that poverty rates out-perform inequality in a cross
country regression, suggesting that it is within-country poverty rather than
inequality that matters for growth (see also Lopez and Serven, 2009). But
Ravallion's finding does not survive the inclusion of country-level fixed
effects, and therefore may be driven by unobserved correlates of countrylevel poverty.
Accommodating the emerging evidence on growth impacts from
within-country poverty and inequality focuses attention on what we will
call microeconomic poverty traps—situations in which low income may be
self-perpetuating for households or local communities. To see why, suppose
that households below and above the poverty line receive average per-capita
incomes yp and y^ > yp respectively. The economy's growth rate is a
weighted average of income growth within the two groups, so defining h
as the poverty headcount ratio and A = h-yp/y as the share of the poor in
overall national income, we have ^ = A-5> + (1 - A)-gN. The response of overall
growth to a one-time change in the incomes of the poor is therefore
dgidyp = A • dgpfdyp -t- (1 - A) • dgN/dy?
An economy-wide poverty trap holds, in our definition, if dg / dyp > 0 over
some empirically relevant range of incomes of the poor. Microeconomic
poverty traps {dgpidyp) are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
this to occur, because the final term can be of either sign and may be domin
ant in practice. But as A rises, an overall trap becomes increasingly less plaus
ible in the absence of mechanisms that make poverty self-perpetuating at the
household level.® Table 3.2 estimates the consumption share of the poor in
various regions, using the lowest poverty line ($1.25 a day) and drawing on
consumption surveys conducted since 2000. At 25 per cent of GDP, the
consumption share of the poor in SSA is double their share in the East Asia
and Pacific region and three times their share in South Asia. A higher poverty
line would of course scale this 25 per cent figure up further.
These observations suggest that research on microeconomic poverty traps
may have an important role to play in improving the knowledge base for
growth strategies in Africa. In the remainder of this section we briefly review

® Of course, it is also unlikely that low incomes among the poor could seriously constrain growth
opportunities for the rich—so that
dyp > 0—if poverty were a temporary phenomenon at the
household level. Thus Azam (2007), for example, argues that deprivation among the poor can
increase the threat of armed rebellion, an argument that relies not just on low current income, but
also on limited prospects for future income (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). But persistent poverty is
not the same thing as self-perpetuating poverty—just as, in the neoclassical model, permanently
adverse fundamentals ate consistent with conditional convergence, not with development traps.
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Table 3.2. Headcount ratios, Gini coefficients, and consumption shares of the poor
Region

SSA
lAC
SASIA
EAR
MENAT
ECA

number
of surveys

38
2
3
7
7
23

Regional averages
Headcount
ratio, h (%)

Gini coefficient, C

Approximate consumption
share of the poor,0 (%)

50
0
21
29
4
6

44
47
40
39
39
33

25
0
8
13
1
2

Source. Worid Bank, PovcalNet online database. The headcount and Gini are calculated from the latest available
consumption survey data for 2000 or later, and using $1.25 (PPP) a day as the poverty line. We have calculated
the approximate consumption shares of the poor for each country as follows: if the poverty headcount is 43%, the
approximate consumption share of the poor is the sum of the shares of the lowest 4 consumption deciles plus 3/10 of the
share of the 5th decile. This will be slightly upwardly biased due to inequality of incomes within deciles.

the relevant theory, in light of our earlier discussion. Section 4 then looks at
approaches to assessing the empirical relevance of microeconomic traps.

3.1 Microeconomic trap mechanisms
To set the stage for our discussion of microeconomic traps, consider three
caricatures of how microeconomic heterogeneity might be accommodated
within a one-sector growth analysis. The first assumes complete and competi
tive markets in general equilibrium: its close relationship to the neoclassical
growth paradigm will be apparent. The second captures a market failure that
undermines aggregate efficiency and is biased against the poor: borrowing
requires collateral, and the poor have no collateral. The third creates ineffi
ciency through a political distortion: the rich dominate political institutions
and use their power to prevent the poor from setting up firms as entrepreneurs.
In each case we follow the lead of Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and focus on
how capital markets allocate available resources among heterogeneous uses.
To introduce heterogeneity we assume that individuals are endowed with
projects of limited size that only they can implement. These projects use
capital to produce a homogeneous output, and their productivity varies across
individuals. For simplicity we impose diminishing returns at the individual
level by assuming that each project can use up to 1 unit of capital (with
constant returns), after which the marginal return goes to zero. This extreme
version of diminishing returns is not necessary for our argument provided that
each project has an upper limit of the amount of capital it can employ
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Again for simplicity, we assume that there are
no imperfections in goods or labour markets.
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COMPLETE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Suppose that capital markets work perfectly. At a point like 3 in Figure 3.6, the
country's very small capital stock would flow into the hands of the small
proportion of the population possessing the highest-productivity projects.
These entrepreneurs would earn rents on their superior skills or ideas; other
households would be workers. Households lacking productive labour or highyielding investment projects could end up severely disadvantaged, but the
initial distribution of capital across households would be irrelevant to the set
of projects implemented, and any household capable of saving would receive
a return equal to the (high) economy-wide marginal return to capital. If there
were diminishing returns at the microeconomic level, moreover, this would
provide some impetus for convergence of incomes across households: other
things equal, for example, households with low initial education would have
an easier time borrowing to finance education than households with initially
higher attainment. The standard trade-off between equity and efficiency
would prevail; redistributive policies would be costly in terms of efficiency
but potentially justifiable on ethical grounds. Poverty traps would be absent,
whether economy-wide or at the microeconomic level.
As noted by Banerjee and Duflo (2005), an aggregate production function
with diminishing returns exists in this economy, despite the heterogeneity of
projects at the microeconomic level. Moreover, in this economy capital mar
kets achieve dynamic efficiency in the sense of maximizing the economy's
end-of-period capital stock over any finite horizon, subject to the sequence of
aggregate consumption up to that period (Burmeister, 1980).
REGRESSIVE MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
Suppose instead that imperfections of information and enforcement induce
lenders to use wealth as collateral. Access to credit is now severely restricted for
poor households, and capital markets fail to equalize the returns to capital
across projects. The average marginal product of capital across poor house
holds is higher than the average marginal product for the non-poor, because
the poor have (some) high-yielding projects that are going unexploited while
the non-poor are investing to the point of low marginal returns.
In this setting there is no well-behaved aggregate production function
mnning through point 4 in Figure 3.6, and the one-sector growth model
may fail even as a first-order approximation (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). We
know that dynamic efficiency fails, but we cannot analyse the development
process without knowing more about how resources are actually allocated in
the economy. Elegant models have been developed to this end by Galor and
Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996), and Aghion and Bolton (1997). In these models
the level and growth of aggregate output depends on the distribution of
income and wealth (see also World Bank, 2005). These models often
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emphasize inequality rather than poverty per se, but they generate poverty
traps when the relevant market failures are triggered by low absolute income
or wealth, as in models of collateral-based lending.
POLITICALLY
GENERATED DISTORTIONS
I

Now suppose that information and enforcement problems are absent but that
political power is monopolized by a wealthy elite that is determined to
exclude a poor majority from access to resources and political power
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Adam and O'Connell, 1999). Institutions are
built over time to reflect the interests of the elite; these institutions influence
the size and nature of public expenditures (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson
and Tabellini, 1994) and, in our example, prevent the non-elite from operat
ing as entrepreneurs rather than workers.
To take the most extreme case, suppose that the economy's capital is
allocated lexicographically: first to any member of the elite group willing to
borrow, and only next, if an excess supply of capital remains at the economy
wide level, to members of the non-elite. Within the two groups, for simplicity,
capital is allocated efficiently, so as to equalize marginal products across
projects. Figures.? shows an example in which the elite comprise one-third
of the population and the productivity of projects is drawn randomly from the

Figure 3.7. Regressive political distortions
The upper dashed curve shows an aggregate production function along which all feasible
projects are ordered from most to least productive. The straight line is the output required to
generate saving sufficient to just replace the existing capital stock, as in the Solow model. If all
feasible projects are implemented the total required capital is 42. All individuals draw a project
randomly from the overall distribution of returns. The political elite comprise one-third of the
population, and their projects ate implemented (on an efficient basis within the elite, the most
productive first) before any project of the non-elite is implemented. At the kink, where k = 14 (= 42/3),
the elite have mn out of projects to implement. Any additional capital is allocated efficiently
among projects of the non-elite. In the configuration shown, there are two locally stable equilibria
with a threshold of about k = 16.
Notes:
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same distribution for each group. The aggregate production function has a
sharp nonconvexity at a capital stock sufficient to finance all of the projects of
the elite. If we model saving and population growth as in the Solow model, an
economy-wide development trap emerges. Unless the aggregate capital stock
is well clear of a threshold (in Figure 3.7, at a capital stock of roughly 16),
income stays low for an extended period.
This development trap implies a poverty trap in our narrower sense if it is
perpetuated by the low incomes of the non-elite. Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997) argue that in highly unequal Latin American societies, low levels of
income and education have worked to prevent the non-elite from mounting
effective legal or institutional counter-attacks against regressive policies.
From a standard public finance perspective, of course, redistribution does
not have to be regressive to undermine growth, or to generate a link from
poverty to growth. Some prominent alternative theories argue that poverty
imdermines the investment environment for the wealthy. In an unequal but
otherwise well-functioning democracy, for example, the median voter holds
little capital and may therefore support a growth-reducing platform of high
capital taxation and aggressive redistribution (Benabou, 1996). In a similar
vein but focusing on armed conflict, Azam (2007) and Bates (2007) develop
theories of civil war and rebel activity in which poverty undermines invest
ment by the rich—and drives existing assets abroad—^by reducing the oppor
tunity cost of violence among the non-elite. Theories of crime may operate
similarly. These approaches differ sharply from our case at the microeconomic
level, however: in our case social returns are higher among the poor than the
rich, while in these theories the reverse is true.

3.2 Further mechanisms
The previous subsection illustrated two broadly plausible channels from pov
erty to growth in Africa: one operating through the interaction of poverty and
market imperfections and the other through the effect of poverty on political
and economic institutions. We argued that these channels can help explain
why entire economies may fail to develop, as well as suggesting specific
mechanisms through which subgroups remain poor. Here we take a brief
look at some additional mechanisms operating under these headings.
Additional growth-reducing interactions may occur between poverty and
financial market imperfections, by requiring poor households to engage in
When markets are complete and competitive, any Intervention to redistribute resources
produces a deadweight loss, unless the government has access to non-distortionary instruments
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). The equity/efficiency trade-off, from this perspective, is an
implication of a more general 'redistribution/efflciency' trade-off.
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asset-building strategies that are difficult to sustain in the face of urgent
consumption needs and insecure vehicles for saving. Thus if discrete, comple
mentary or 'lumpy' investments in physical or human capital are needed to
increase productivity above a minimum threshold, households unable either
to borrow or to build assets sustainably may be stuck in a low-productivity
state. The absence of credit and insurance markets may also leave house
holds that are too poor to build asset buffers exposed to potentially cata
strophic short-term declines in consumption. This exposure may in turn
lead to inadequate investments in high-yielding but risky activities including
education, fertility control, and the adoption of new seed varieties or agricul
tural techniques (Dercon, 2002; 2005).
Another plausible example of a micro development trap is nutritional.
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) assume that production requires a caloric intake
that exceeds the body's resting requirement (the basic metabolic rate). Work
effort is then subject to a threshold effect, whereby small increases in nutri
tional intake, once basic requirements are met, generate disproportionate
increases in productivity. Redistribution in favour of poor households that
are unable to borrow can enhance both equity and economy-wide productiv
ity (Dasgupta and Ray, 1987).
Carter and Barrett (2006) emphasize an analogy between household-level
income dynamics and our development trap analysis in the presence of
market imperfections. In this setting, households may have characteristics
(skills and/or preferences) that tie down their ultimate equilibrium welfare
level, but the path to this equilibrium displays nonlinearities and varying
returns to scale that give rise to the same kind of state-dependence we empha
sized with our non-monotonic phase diagrams. Similar interactions can in
principle arise through neighbourhood effects involving corruption and other
conformity and peer-group influences, through self-reinforcing individual
and social beliefs, or through coordination failures and externalities
(Mookherjee and Ray, 2001; Mookherjee, 2006).
Sachs et al. (2004) and others argue that sub-Saharan Africa's geographic
and economic features favour microeconomic development traps. Features
like high transportation costs, small market sizes, and a high disease burden
(Bloom et al., 2003) can generate local or regional poverty traps if the com
munities they affect are too poor to generate sufficiently large-scale invest
ments to overcome them.

" Deaton (1992) emphasizes the role of impatience in limiting precautionary saving by
households shut out from credit markets. Mullinaithan and Shaflr (2013) argue that excessive
impatience and limited self-control may In part be behavioural offshoots of living with a chronic
scarcity of resources.
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As a final observation we note that trap-like mechanisms can readily interact
at a sectorial or general-equilibrium level. As in big-push theories of develop
ment, complementarities may exist between the inputs needed to foster
development, including for example road infrastmcture, electricity, and an
educated labour force. Increasing capital in any one of these dimensions
might produce little effect in the absence of investment in the others.
Mwabu and Thorbecke (2004) argue that market failures and institutional
failures may reinforce each other in rural areas of Africa. Thus, difficulties in
enforcing contracts and poorly functioning financial, land, and labour mar
kets may interact to encourage subsistence activities, illiquid investments, and
growth-reducing behaviour. These micro traps may then be compounded by
problems of insecurity, poor levels of public goods and services, dispropor
tionate taxation of agricultural output, and poor infrastructure; arguably
caused by institutions that do not take sufficiently into account the interests
of rural dwellers.

4 Microeconomic Poverty Traps: Evidence
There are serious empirical difficulties in establishing the existence and nature
of microeonomic poverty traps. The productivity impact of better health and
education, for example, may be subject to long delays. Individual and
community-level investment may be complementary to macro investments
in larger-scale infrastructure and social services, and these economy-wide
variables may be difficult to control adequately in environments where they
change very little. Finally, empirical work on microeconomic development
traps will typically have to handle endogeneity of the behavioural variables of
interest, as well as unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants of output
and productivity. Fertility-based traps, for example, rely on the joint deter
mination of income and fertility behaviour. Spatial poverty traps may be
correlated with locational variables, to take another example, but if there are
unobserved variables that determine both location and income, it would be
misleading to interpret location effects in an income regression as evidence of
poverty traps. Despite these caveats, however, there are several ways in which
the existence of microeconomic development traps can be suggested. By direct
analogy with the economy-wide case, these are situations in which the
expected growth rate of income for poor households is not merely low in
absolute terms, but lower than it is at higher income levels, although such
households may not face an outright poverty trap. We briefly describe a few
of them and provide suggestive evidence that these can matter particularly
in Africa.
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4.1 Poverty and inequality in Africa
By absolute standards, income poverty in Africa is both widespread and
greater than in any other region of the world. Unlike in most other
developing-country regions, it has also failed to decrease significantly in
recent decades. Table 3.3 shows that the proportion of individuals living
below 1.25 dollars per day has fallen considerably over the last three decades
in Asia and in the Pacific. In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion has finally
begun to fall after rising through the mid 1990s. Table 3.4 shows that Africa
will probably soon contain the largest absolute number of poor people on
earth, larger than in East Asia or in South Asia, where absolute population sizes
are larger. Table 3.4 also shows that the total number of the poor in developing
countries fell by nearly 950 million between 1981 and 2011; in Africa, it
increased by over 200 million. This suggests that Africa is lagging not only
in relative but also in absolute terms.
In section 3 we characterized a poverty trap as a situation in which df/dyp >
0, i.e., in which higher incomes for the poor mean faster overall growth. In
such a situation, a process of distribution-neutral growth—in which all
Table 3.3. Percentages of the developing-country population living
below $1.25 a day, by region, 1981 -2011
Regions

1981

1996

2011

East Asia and Pacific
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
All developing countries

78.0
2.9
11.7
8.9
61.4
52.8
52.7

38.3
4.3
10.6
4.8
48.6
59.8
35.9

7.9
0.5
4.6
1.7
24.5
46.9
17.0

Source. World Bank, PovcalNet online database.

Table 3.4. Numbers of people (in millions) living below $1.25 a day, by
developing-country region, 1981 -2011
Regions
East Asia and Pacific
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total

1981

1996

2011

1,107.5
12.6
42.5
15.3
570.3
210.4
1,958.3

681.9
20.1
51.1
12.3
630.0
359.2
1,754.4

160.8
2.4
27.6
5.6
399.0
415.8
1,011.4

Source. World Bank, PovcalNet online database.

75

Jean-Yves Duclos and Stephen A. O'Connell

incomes rise at roughly equal rates, so that measures of inequality remain
unchanged—tends to be self-reinforcing, through its impact on the incomes
of the poor. In the growth model of Galor and Moav (2004), for example, low
levels of economy-wide human capital form a binding constraint on invest
ment in physical capital. The scarcity of human capital, in turn, is concen
trated among the poor, who cannot bonow to finance their children's
education. Inequality is bad for growth in the sense that for a given average
income, greater inequality generates a lower level of human capital invest
ment. But any general improvement in living standards—even one accom
panied by a mild increase in inequality—reduces the share of the population
with incomes low enough to activate the credit market constraint. Ultimately
it is poverty, rather than inequality, that constrains growth in this model.
We suggested in section 3.1 that it may be inequality rather than poverty
per se that constrains growth, for example by sustaining political institutions
that impair long-term development (World Bank, 2005). 'Inequality' here can
of course refer as much to inequality of opportunity (e.g., access to markets
and public services) as to inequality of earnings or consumption. But
distribution-neutral growth is unlikely to overcome constraints that are
grounded in either type of inequality. Such concerns are potentially relevant
for Africa, where inequality is high by comparison with other regions (and
comparable to Latin America; see Table 3.2). Within Africa, of course, their
relevance may vary considerably (Figure 3.8): inequality in parts of southern
Africa is among the highest in the world, while Mauritius has low inequality
even by the standards of OECD countries.

4.2 Correlates of poverty in Africa
The poor in Africa are heterogeneous in nature and can be found in all social
classes. But there are characteristics that tend to be systematically correlated
with poverty both across countries and over time. The nature of these char
acteristics is suggestive of the factors that can induce development traps.
Household poverty is positively correlated with household size, the absence
of adults of working age, and the presence of children and elderly people.
These are stmctural socio-demographic characteristics that evolve slowly
and can be difficult to change by one's own will. Family formation, fertility
decisions, and productive arrangements are examples of factors that affect
stmctural demographic characteristics and that depend on what can be longlasting cultural norms. These characteristics naturally tend to perpetuate
themselves across generations. They are also subject to neighbourhood effects.
The poor usually lack physical and financial assets as well as income. Pov
erty is also highly correlated with being landless. When the poor do own land.
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Mauritius
Ethiopia
Niger
Tanzania
Benin
Mauritaria
Guinea
Ghana
Mali
Mazambique
Senegal
Angola
Burkina Faso
Nigeria
Burundi
Cameroon
Uganda
Kenya
Cite d'lvore
Madagascar
Zimbabwe
Gambia, The
Malawi
Zambia
South Africa
Lesatho
Swaziland
Central African Republic
Botswana
Namibia
0

0.2

0.4
0.6
Gini coefficient

0.8

Figure 3.8. Within-country inequality
Source:

World Bank (2005).

that land is often relatively unproductive, difficult to access, and/or difficult to
irrigate. It is also difficult to improve and exchange in formal land markets.
Subsistence agriculture is nevertheless the main source of income for many
of the poor in Africa. Agricultural output also tends to be one of the most
volatile sources of income and one in which it is the most difficult to invest in
economies with weakly functioning credit and land markets. Again, this may
be difficult to change if the factors involved extend well beyond the reach of
individuals.
The poor also have a relatively low level of human capital and educational
achievement. Poverty is further strongly associated with occupational and
employment status. For instance, in South Africa, of the 18 million below a
semi-official poverty line in 2004, 14 million lived in workerless households;
most of these households contained working-age but unemployed people
(Meth 2007). Hence, in addition to having lower levels of human capital
and skills, the poor are often unable to sell their labour in a reasonably free
and competitive labour market.
The poor frequently suffer from hunger, malnutrition, and illness. Non
monetary measures of well-being therefore tend to be worse for the incomepoor, as reflected in such indicators such as child mortality rates, stunting.
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wasting, and the incidence of illness. Moreover, access to health care is typic
ally more difficult for the poor. This hostile health environment can further
deteriorate the productive value of their human capital. Undemutrition has
indeed been found to lower productivity (Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988),
while malnutrition in children tends to decrease their learning and future
productivity (e.g., Glewwe et al., 2001). All of this suggests that inequality in
income and in nutrition may decrease total productivity (and its growth).
Poverty tends to be associated with membership in ethnic minorities and
particular racial groups. These groups tend to face higher income poverty and
greater deprivation of schooling and health achievements and to benefit less
from infrastructure investment and other types of public goods and services.
Poverty is also associated with weak participation in social and political pro
cesses, and is sometimes reflected in exploitative relationships that can again
deny the poor access to markets and to public and private goods and services.

4.3 Spatial development traps
Household-level studies systematically find that the characteristics of the
region of residence are correlated with living standards and poverty, even
after controlling for other household characteristics. Although there are sev
eral ways in which location can influence poverty through purely geographic
effects, the association between geography and infrastructure, access to public
services, and market quality is also usually very strong. Poorer areas are often
geographically distant from formal input and output markets. Such distance
implies limited work opportunities or exclusion from areas and enclaves in
which growth is concentrated. Markets that are geographically close to poor
areas, in turn, tend to be relatively less developed. Non-farm employment, for
instance, can be scarce and seasonal. Poorer areas also tend to have lower access
to public services, such as education and health. Ayadi et al. (2005) argue that
in Tunisia rural roads have played an important role in helping the rural poor
connect to urban markets and services, and that this has improved their living
conditions. Although no estimates of the returns to this infrastmcture are
presented, such estimates could be implicitly taken as evidence for the exist
ence of development traps, especially if they differ significantly across areas.
A disproportionate number of the poor are also located in areas where arable
land is scarce or is of relatively bad quality, or where droughts, floods, and other
environmental shocks generate relatively high levels of community-level risk.
This generates lower agricultural productivity and/or greater vulnerability. Both
of these tend to decrease investment in physical (and often in human) capital.
Whether spatial externalities create a development trap is certainly of inter
est. This would be the case for instance if living in a poor area meant a lower
return on one's investment, and if one could not invest elsewhere because of
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imperfect capital markets. The evidence for such effects, however, is easily
confounded by correlations between location and unobserved household
characteristics. Panel data can be useful in such a context. With such data
for rural China, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) find that location-specific capital
has geographically divergent impacts on household consumption growth,
after controlling for both observed and unobserved household characteristics.
They argue that since poorer areas have access to lower levels of productivity
enhancing public goods like transportation infrastmcture, households in
those areas are hampered by lower productivity on their human and capital
investments. This discourages them from making such investments and thus
makes them subject to a spatial development trap.

4.4 Correlates of chronic and temporary poverty
Evidence suggestive of the existence of development traps can also be
obtained by examining patterns in the distribution of chronic and transient
poverty. The idea here is that the correlates of chronic poverty, or those that
reduce the likelihood of exiting poverty, may be associated with the presence
of development traps.
As in the case of poverty at a point in time, the distribution of chronic and
transitory spells of poverty is strongly correlated both with location and with
household characteristics (Okidi and McKay, 2003). The characteristics that
matter differ somewhat across space, but some—such as asset holdings—often
play a consistently key role. Exits out of and entries into poverty are usually
explained by demographic and employment changes. This suggests that
structural household shifts, such as household composition changes (death
of a household member, dissolution, marriage, migration) or shifts in envir
onmental parameters (e.g., an increased incidence of involuntary unemploy
ment in the local area) can cause important changes in well-being (Woolard
and Klasen, 2005).
Some household characteristics, such as household size, educational levels,
unskilled labour power, and low levels of asset holding, also tend to influence
the probability of moving into and out of poverty, regardless of initial poverty
status (Bokosi, 2007; Barrett et al., 2006).
The determinants of chronic poverty and vulnerability are often similar.
One reason for this might be that the characteristics that increase vulnerabil
ity to a spell of poverty also impede the household's ability to exit such a spell.
The chronically poor are indeed often found in less secure environments, and
are those whose assets are too low to cope adequately with shocks. As we have
emphasized, coping strategies may involve sacrificing long-term investments
in order to address shorter-term needs.
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4.5 Imperfect markets and subsistence traps
Market failures are pervasive in low-income countries and in some cases even
the rudimentary institutional underpinnings of market activity are absent
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). Banerjee and Duflo (2005) cite extensive evidence
that the returns on capital are not equalized across firms or households. Hsieh
and Klenow (2008) compare marginal products of capital at the factory level
and show that if the capital stock were allocated as efficiently within narrowly
defined industries in China and India as it is in the USA, TFP would be 30-50
per cent higher in China and 40-60 per cent higher in India. As noted earlier,
Banerjee and Duflo (2005) take this argument further by citing evidence that
market failures affect poor households disproportionately (see also World
Bank, 2005).
One observation potentially consistent with imperfect-market traps is that
farm yields (output per acre) in poor countries tend to be lower the larger
the landholding (Binswanger et al., 1995). A possible explanation is the
existence of factor and credit market failures that hinder the reallocation of
land sizes. If this were the case, then redistributing land from large land
holders to smaller ones would raise total output. The existence of credit
market failures also leads individual incomes to be an increasing concave
function of their past value, implying that an equalizing redistribution
would raise average income (Ravallion, 2004). Evidence of this is reported
in Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) for Russia, and in Jalan and Ravallion
(2001) for mral China.

4.6 Gender- and power-based traps
The existence of gender-associated differences in well-being and poverty is
also suggestive of development traps, this time generated within the house
hold. These traps can exist for the same reason that development traps may
exist at the household and macroeconomic levels: due to market imperfec
tions and/or to power-protecting institutions that sustain growth-reducing
and discriminatory environments.
An increasingly important strand of the microeconomic literature examines
the intra-household allocation of resources. This is difficult to study because
many indicators of well-being are reliably observable only at the household
level. One of the systematic correlates of individual well-being, howeverbased on indicators such as educational achievements or health status—is
gender. Women and girls indeed tend to have lower educational achieve
ments in Africa. They are also often more vulnerable to health shocks, includ
ing those associated with pregnancy and birth-giving. They also tend to wield
less power in family and community-level decision-making.
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Power differentials that that sustain and are sustained by economic inequal
ity may also operate powerfully against the poor, and in ways that may or may
not be mediated through gender. Bates (1981) argued that a policy bias against
agriculture in Africa reflected the ease with which urban and rural elites could
disarm collective action in poor mral communities. The incentives for power
capture may also interact with and sustain any pre-existing ethno-social
polarization of communities. Power and inequality dynamics may reach
down to a very local level, particularly where mobility is limited: Galasso
and Ravallion (2005), for example, find that those villages in Bangladesh
where the distribution of land is more unequal are also less good at targeting
the poor, possibly because this is also where the poor are less influential in
village decision-making.

4.7 Mobility and time dependency
State dependence arises when the household's probability of exiting its cur
rent state depends not just on the household's characteristics, but also on its
history of being in or out of poverty. In such cases, two households with
identical characteristics may display different probabilities of entering or
exiting poverty if they differ in their distributions of previous poverty status.
There is some evidence of state dependence in poverty dynamics, and a
suggestion that this may be stronger in certain environments (such as in
urban areas; Islam and Shimeles, 2007). State dependence is difficult to infer
formally, however, since the household's initial poverty status may be correl
ated with its unobserved characteristics.
Woolard and Klasen (2005) find that most of the income mobility observed
in South Africa is related to demographic and employment changes. They
view this as evidence in favour of four types of development trap, associated in
turn with large initial household size, poor initial education, poor initial asset
endowment, and poor initial employment. Care must be taken here, because
demographic and employment variables are subject to household choice and
may therefore be endogenous to levels and future expected changes in living
standards. But some of the demographic or employment changes may indeed
be determined by purely exogenous external shocks (such as deaths, or
changes in employment in an environment of high involuntary unemploy
ment such as exists in South Africa) that are difficult to reverse by the mere will
of households. In this case, the fact that changes in characteristics are correl
ated with subsequent poverty dynamics can indeed be taken as suggestive
evidence of household-level development traps.
A related approach assesses the extent of intergenerational mobility as well
as indicators of inequality of opportunity. Cogneau et al. (2006), for example,
find that two countries with relatively low cross-sectional income inequality.
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Ghana and Uganda, also display relatively high intergenerational mobility
and low inequality of opportunity (estimated by comparing the achievements
of individuals conditional on the social origins and characteristics of parents).
This can be done without panel data, so long as information on more than one
generation is available. As always the implications in terms of the existence of
development traps must be treated with care because of possible problems of
correlation of unobserved characteristics across generations.

4.8 Asset traps
An interesting approach to testing for development traps uses dynamic
household-level data on consumption and assets. The approach considers
the evolution of assets in comparison to the assets expected to be needed to
exit poverty. Mobility in living standards may be of little use if periods of
relative prosperity are not used to accumulate assets. A failure to accumulate
assets during good times may indeed mean that a household will eventually be
pushed back to subsistence levels when worse times come. An important issue
is therefore whether chronically poor households use temporary exits from
poverty to move onto a trajectory of asset accumulation, in such a way that
they would at some point exit the risk of chronic poverty.
One procedure that has been used to investigate this is to compute the
consumption value that assets provide, and to estimate the asset stock
required to support consumption above a poverty threshold. Assets vary in
size and in nature, and it is therefore important to incorporate both the
quality and the quantity of the assets households employ to generate con
sumption. Adato et al. (2006), for example, use three types of asset to build an
asset index for South African households: human capital (education), natural
and productive capital (such as land, livestock, and equipment), and
uneamed/transfer income. To allow for development-trap dynamics, Adato
et al. hypothesize that temporary shocks to income and consumption can
have permanents effects on living standards. To see this, it is useful to consider
Figure 3.9, drawn from their paper. This shows the asset index at some later
period, A(At)—^written as a function of the vector At of individual assets—as a
function of its value in some earlier period, A(Ao). A 45-degree line shows
when initial and later assets are equal. The solid line shows one possible
configuration of the dynamics. In this case, a household that starts with assets
between A{Ap) and /l(Am) will decumulate assets over time, ending with an
asset index in period t that is below the initial level. Given the shape of the
A(Ai) line, ^(A*) is a locally stable development-trap equilibrium. The house
hold can only escape this trap by experiencing a large enough jump in assets
to place it above the 'Micawber threshold' A{A„^. Above this threshold, assets
converge to A{A*). Note that even if the assets of a household are above A(Am)
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Figure 3.9. Asset dynamics with a Micawber threshold
Source: Adato et al. (2006).

for some time, a shock that pushes assets below A{Am) will force the household
towards the low-level trap at A(Ap). The dashed curve in Figure 3.9 shows an
alternative configuration that implies a unique equilibrium with convergent
dynamics.
Figure 3.10 shows the shape of South African asset dynamics between 1993
and 1998, as estimated from survey data by Adato et al. (2006). Taking into
account the confidence bands, there does seem to be evidence of a Micawber
threshold at an asset index of roughly twice the poverty line. The range of
vulnerability, moreover, is wide: a household with asset index of more than
three times the poverty line could be pushed to a locally stable low-level
equilibrium if an asset shock moved it below the Micawber threshold. The
estimated pattern of asset dynamics would predict that such a household
could experience a drop in expected longer-term assets from more than
three times the poverty line to a lower equilibrium of less than the poverty
line. This would imply a severe change in the living standards, both in the
short and in the longer term.
Suggestive evidence of the existence of development traps can also be
obtained by examining the correlates of the evolution of assets across time.
Assets can be less volatile and easier to measure than consumption and
income. The evolution of assets is usually linked to the educational level of
the household head, the availability of employment, land ownership, family
composition, and geographical isolation (Burke et al., 2007).
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1993 asset index, A93 (poverty line units)
------ expected asset dynamics
------ 95% confidence bands

Figure 3.10. Estimated asset dynamics in South Africa
Source: Adato et al. (2006).

5 Conclusions
Is poverty a binding constraint on growth in sub-Saharan Africa? At the
aggregate level, we have taken an indirect approach to this question, asking
instead whether poverty is what activates one or more of the constraints on
productivity that are widely viewed as potentially relevant in low-income
countries. Our discussion in this chapter suggests the following set of
observations.
• Low income has coexisted with slow growth for a large number of coun
tries since 1960, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa. This is consistent
with development traps but does not imply them.
• The theoretical literature suggests a wide range of mechanisms through
which low income can be self-perpetuating. While the literature focuses
primarily on extreme cases that generate thresholds and multiple equi
libria, we favour a broader definition of development traps that relies on
non-monotonicity of the phase diagram relating growth to income.
• More than one development trap mechanism may be operative in any
country or time period. The growth evidence nonetheless broadly favours
mechanisms that operate through measured productivity rather than
through factor accumulation.
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• Questions about multiplicity, and even about non-monotonicity of the
growth process as a function of income, are difficult to resolve econometrically given the brief period and non-experimental nature of the aggre
gate growth data.
• The growth literature suggests that inequality can undermine growth by
widening the scope of market failures and/or generating resource conflicts
between poor majorities and rich minorities.
• Microeconomic research suggests that market failures disproportionately
penalize the poor. There is ample scope for country-level research to
document this phenomenon and explore its links to household incomes
and wealth.
We have argued that the most promising avenues for further research on
development traps are at the microeconomic level. In particular, countrybased research that assesses the empirical relevance of microeconomic links
from poverty to productivity, in specific contexts, should help redress the
present imbalance between theory and evidence and ultimately strengthen
the basis for policy.
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